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THERESE MAYNARD*
As we mark the first anniversary of the decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co.,' it seems appropriate to reflect on the impact of the Supreme Court's
wayward opinion in that case. During the past year, securities lawyers have
struggled to absorb the implications of the Court's reasoning in Gustafson. As
the bench and bar grapple to understand the Court's method of analysis in that
case, it has become increasingly clear that one of the most profound-although
perhaps unintended-consequences of the Court's opinion in Gustafson is the
impact it has had on the practice of securities law.
This Essay is an effort to focus attention on the troubling results for the
legal profession from the Court's methodology in Gustafson. This Essay will
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. I thank Kay Tate, Maggie Sachs, Norm
Poser, and Jim Gordon for their extremely insightful comments on an earlier draft of this
Essay, and Anastasia Liakas for her invaluable research assistance.
1 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995). The Court's decision was rendered on February 28, 1995.
At the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Gustafson case, the Third and
Seventh Circuits were in conflict. "As the first appellate court to squarely address the issue
of the scope of section 12(2), the Third Circuit had held that [section 12(2)] relief is limited
to only those buyers who are defrauded during the course of initial distribution
transactions." Therese H. Maynard, Implicafions of Central Bank on Gustafson, N.Y. L.,
July 7, 1994, at 5 (emphasis added) (describing holding in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood
Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991)). Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
rule of Ballay. First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir.
1993). The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, "concluded that the express remedy of
section 12(2) is available to any buyer who satisfies the statute's prerequisites-regardless of
whether the plaintiff's purchase was made during the course of a distribution or a trading
market transaction." Maynard, supra (emphasis added) (describing the holding in Pacific
Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993)). The haste with which
this issue reached the High Court for resolution has led at least one commentator to
observe:
[The Supreme Court's decision in Gustafson is] a testimonial to the Supreme Court's
former practice of showing restraint in deciding cases where lower court decisions are
insufficiently ripe.... [Otherwise,] the Court ... injects itself headlong into an
unfamiliar realm and seeks to make new law without fully displaying an understanding
of the ramifications of its decision.
Ted 7. Fiflis, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.: Judicial vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEc. REG.
L.J. 423,440-41 (1996).
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describe how the Court's decision further contributes to the disintegration of
the common understanding of established precedent which had interpreted that
body of statutes known as the federal securities laws.2 This disintegration
carries important consequences for the practice of corporate securities law that
has received scant public comment. By focusing attention on these implications,
this Essay will serve to underscore the urgent need for the legal profession to
acknowledge its obligations as responsible problem solvers in securities law
matters. 3
2 As we bear witness to the erosion of a settled body of administrative and judicial
precedent interpreting the federal securities laws, one of the most profound implications of
the Court's decision becomes increasingly clear: The Court's methodology in Gustafson has
given lawyers a license to challenge established precedent. See infra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text (describing implications of Gustafson's reasoning for the private
placement market as one example of the decision's impact on established precedent);
Therese H. Maynard, 77w Impact of Gustafson and Its Methodology, 24 SEC. REG. L. 61
(1996). In so doing, lawyers have been released from assuming the burden of responsible
counseling when applying provisions of the federal securities laws. Ironically, this new
found "hunting license" is conferred on the bar at a time when public and Congressional
foment over the excesses of securities litigation has led to the enactment of significant
legislation reforming litigation under the federal securities laws. See infra note 4 (discussing
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995). Oddly enough, though, as
the bench and bar struggle to understand Gustafson, one of the consequences least
commented on-perhaps least noticed-is the deleterious impact this decision has visited on
the counseling function of the securities lawyer. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text (describing impact of Gustafson on securities lawyers).
3 The criticisms set forth in this Essay of Gustafson's methodology may very well be
leveled at other substantive areas of Supreme Court decisionmaking. This Essay, however,
is deliberately focused on the Court's jurisprudence under the federal securities laws for two
important reasons. First, on the basis of my own experience as well as discussions with
other securities lawyers over the past year, I am confident that my observations with respect
to the impact of Guswton on the practice of securities law are well founded. Second, and
more importantly, federal securities law is a distinct body of jurisprudence born out of a
discrete body of statutes. As such, this discrete body of federal law exists to regulate our
nation's capital markets, an important national asset. See Securities Exchange Act § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 78b (1994). For many, the unique role played by the federal securities laws in
fostering and protecting this important national asset may be enough to support singling out
for special scrutiny the method of analysis used by the Court in this area of the law. In any
case, to the extent that the observations raised in this Essay are appropriate to other
substantive areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence (bankruptcy and tax law, for example,
come readily to mind), I suggest that students of these other disciplines mount a similar
challenge to the Court's inconsistent methods of analysis, especially if those inconsistent
methods are having the same deleterious impact on the ability of lawyers in these areas to
act as responsible problem solvers. For the reasons just given, however, this Essay will
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I. BACKGROUND OF SUPREME COURT'S FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW DECISIONS
Most significant for purposes of this Essay is the unexpected method of
analysis that the Supreme Court used in Gustafson to support its narrow
interpretation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).4 In the
end, it is the methodology, and not the result reached in Gustafson, that yields
distressing consequences. The methodology used by the Court to reach its
decision in Gustafson represents a dramatic shift in the Court's approach to
interpreting the federal securities laws. Accordingly, some background
regarding the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fraud remedies available
under the federal securities laws is crucial to understanding the implications of
the Court's methodology in Gustafson.
Prior to the mid-1970s, the express remedy of section 12(2) lived in the
shadow of the much more popular implied private remedy of Rule lOb-5. 5 By
its terms, Rule 10b-5 gives the SEC the authority to bring actions for securities
fraud. Beginning in the 1940s, however, the federal courts implied a private
remedy under Rule lOb-5. 6 As an implied remedy, it is the responsibility of the
federal courts-and ultimately, the Supreme Court-to define the scope of relief
available under Rule lOb-5.7
focus on the Court's method of analysis under the federal securities laws.
4 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1996). In December 1995, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995); See
Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform Bill Now Law, 28 See.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2 (Jan. 5, 1996). As part of this legislation, Congress added a new
subsection to section 12, and therefore section 12(2) has now been renumbered section
12(a)(2). Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995). This legislative change, however,
does not alter the original language of section 12(2) itself nor otherwise impact the
substantive analysis of this Essay. For the reader's ease of reference, this Essay will
continue to refer to the section 12 fraud remedy as "section 12(2)."
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
6 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In
1971, the Supreme Court confirmed the existence of an implied private right of action under
Rule lOb-5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13n.9
(1971).
7 For general discussions of Rule lOb-5 and its implied remedy, see 3-3C HAROLD S.
BLOONmAL, SECuRrrEs AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW (1986); 1-6 ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LEwis D. LOWENFELS, SacuRnms FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD passim
(1990 ed.); 1-3 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE IMPACr OF RULE 1OB-5 (1980 rev.); RicHARD W.
JENNINGS ET AL., SECURrIES REGULATION 784-1349 (7th ed. 1992); LOuiS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECUirrIES REGULATION 777-875 (3d ed. 1995). In addition
to the articles cited in these authoritative treatises, see also Douglas M. Branson, Presdence
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Early on, the Supreme Court's decisions were characterized by an
expansive approach to interpreting the various provisions of the federal
securities laws.8 In these early years, on the very few occasions that the
Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the Rule 10b-5 remedy itself, the
Court painted with a very broad brush. 9 Owing in large part to the hospitable
climate created by this expansive attitude towards Rule 10b-5, the implied
remedy flourished in the lower courts. With time, Rule 10b-5 became the
defrauded plaintiffs' favored remedy. Indeed, it was the most widely used
remedy under the federal securities laws. 10 In fact, Rule lOb-5 ballooned so
much that it eclipsed the express remedies Congress established under the
federal securities laws, including the express remedy of section 12(2).
By the mid-1970s, however, a dramatic shift occurred in the Court's
attitude. The Court took a definite dislike to implied remedies in general and its
and Vindication. Federal Courts, SEC Rule 10b-5, and the Work of David S. Ruber, 85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 613 (1991); Steven Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
8 See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). On the question of the
implication of a private right of action, see generally 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra
note 7, ch. 2; JENNiNGs El" AL., supra note 7, ch. 13; Alfred F. Conard, Securities
Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 193 (1985); Michael J. Kaufam,
The Umfonn Rule of Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Judicial Creation of a
Comprehensive Scheme of Investor Insurance, 63 TEMPLE L. REV. 61 (1990); Margaret V.
Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be
Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 96 (1985); William F. Schneider, Implying Private
Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C. L. REV. 853 (1984); Marc
I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cunulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 557 (1982).
9 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Justice
Douglas's opinion in that case has been characterized as reflecting the "apogee of the reach
of Rule 10b-5. The facts illustrate the breadth in the potential wrongdoing covered [by the
Rule 10b-5 remedy]." CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
COmPRATIONS AND OTHER BusINmss ASSOCIATIONS 848 (1992); see also Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (adopting an expansive interpretation of the
reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 in a manner that is generally regarded as favorable to
plaintiffs).
10 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 779. The story of the rise and fall of Rule
10b-5's implied remedy has been chronicled at length in the literature. See generally
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 7; 5-5e ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LnmGATION & PRACrIcE
UNDER RULE 10b-5 (2d ed. 1981); DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INsIDER TRADING
REGULATION: A TREATISE ON THE DEFINITION, PREVENTION AND REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING (1990 ed.); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 777-80; Joseph A. Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's
Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994).
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dislike for the implied remedy of Rule 10b-5 became most apparent. 11 In a
series of decisions rendered in the mid-to-late 1970s, the Court substantially
curtailed the availability of relief under Rule 10b-5 by adopting a more
restrictive interpretation of the elements of this implied cause of action. 12 As a
result, the Court's decisions now make it much harder for plaintiffs to recover
under Rule 10b-5.13
What is most important for purposes of this Essay is the method used by
the Court to do all this pruning. The Court repeatedly emphasized that the
scope of the Rule 10b-5 remedy was defined by the express language of the
statute. Therefore, efforts by the SEC or private litigants to present policy
arguments urging the Court to take a more expansive approach to interpreting
the scope of Rule 10b-5 were eschewed in favor of keeping the focus on the
language of the statute-that is, the language of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.14 The Court grew fond of beginning its opinions in this
area with the mantra: The starting point of our analysis is, as it must be, the
language of the statute.15
Moreover, this same analytical approach was used by the Court on the
very few occasions when an issue under the federal securities laws other than
Rule 10b-5 presented itself to the Court. For example, in 1985 in Landreth
Timber v. Landreth,16 the Court had to resolve the fate of what had become
known as the "sale of business" doctrine.' 7 Specifically, the Supreme Court
11 "During the 1960s and early 1970s, federal courts extended Rule lOb-5 to cover a
broad range of corporate activity .... After several new appointments to the Supreme
Court in the 1970s, the Court began limiting sharply the reach of the rule." O'KELLEY &
THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 841.
12 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975). The High Court's continuing hostility towards the implied cause of action under
Rule lOb-5 is reflected in more recent Court decisions as well. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991); Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
13 Not surprisingly, as recovery under Rule lOb-5 became more difficult, reliance on
the express remedy of section 12(2) increased. See Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent Trading in Postdiribution
Markets, 32WM. & MARYL. REV. 847, 851 (1991).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
15 See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); Teamsters
v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197; Blue aip Stamps,
421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring).
16 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
17 Until Landreth, the sale of business doctrine was relied on by several lower federal
133119961
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had to decide if the transaction at issue in that case involved the sale of a
"security." 18 To decide this issue, the Court-not surprisingly-turned to the
language of the statute as the starting point of its analysis. In particular, the
Court looked first to the language of section 2 of the 1933 Act, which defines
the terms used throughout the remaining provisions of the 1933 Act. 19 Thus,
courts to conclude that "a sale of an entire business [was] not considered a 'security'
transaction for the purposes of the [federal] securities laws, even if [the transaction] was
accomplished by a sale of stock having the traditional attributes of stock ownership."
JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 7, at 299. The commentators, like the lower federal courts,
were sharply divided as to whether the sale of all or part of the stock of a business
organized as a corporation qualified as a "security" under the federal securities laws. See,
e.g., Stephen J. Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a
Transactional Context-Based Analysisfor Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAw. 929
(1984); Scott FitzGibbon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to
Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); Thomas L. Hazen,
Taking Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations: When Is Stock Not a
Security?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 393 (1983); Dennis S. Kaijala, Realigning Federal and State
Roles in Securities Regulation Through the Definition of a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
413 (1992); Gary S. Rosin, Functional Exclusions from the Definitions of a Security, 28 S.
TaX. L. REV. 333, 575 (1986); Gary S. Rosin, Historical Perspectives on the Definition of a
Security, 28 S. TaX. L. REv. 575 (1987); Irving P. Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security:
The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637
(1982); Robert B. Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of
a Company's Stock Is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1982);
Christine L. McAneny, Comment, Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchase of
Corporate Stock. An Argument for Exclusion from Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 295 (1980); Jacque L. Nims, Comment, A Criticism of the Sale of Business
Doctrine, 71 CAL. L. REv. 974 (1983); Note, Repudiating the Sale-of-Business Doctrine, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1718 (1983). Similarly, the federal courts were divided in their willingness
to accept the sale of business doctrine. Some appellate courts rejected the sale of business
doctrine. See, e.g., Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 338 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985); Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 497 (5th
Cir. 1983); Cole v. PPG Indus., Inc., 680 F.2d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 1982); Golden v.
Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d
1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1979). Other appellate courts accepted the sale of business doctrine.
See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
471 U.S. 681 (1985); Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983); King v.
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.
1982).
18 See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 683. This case is important not only because of the
method the Court used to decide the narrow issue before it, but also because the facts of
Landreth are substantially the same as the facts of Gustafson. See infra notes 42-44 and
accompanying discussion (describing transaction at issue in Gustafson).
19 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994).
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the starting point of the Court's analysis was the definition of "security"
contained in section 2(1).20 In so doing, the Court ignored the substantial body
of commentary that urged it to reject a straightforward application of the plain
meaning of the statute.2 ' The Supreme Court indicated that it felt constrained to
give force and effect to the definitions set out in the statute, and that these
definitions formed the foundation for the Court's analysis.22
Again in 1988, the Court was required to consider the scope of section
12(1), which contains the other express remedy set out by Congress in section.
12 of the 1933 Act.23 In Pinter v. Dah!,2 4 the plaintiff brought a cause of
action under section 12(1) against the seller-defendant for rescission of the
plaintiff's purchase of a security. The High Court was required to decide if the
defendant fell within the scope of "seller," as that term was used in section
12(1). To decide this issue, the Court again turned to the definitions in section
2 and-not surprisingly-focused its analysis on the definition of the terms
"offer" and "sale" contained in section 2(3).25 This approach is entirely
consistent with the methodology developed by the Supreme Court over the last
twenty years in its securities law decisions.
I. BACKGROUND REGARDING THBE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 12(2)
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. The Elements of a Section 12(2) Action
Before examining the method of analysis used by the Court to decide
Gustafson, a brief overview of the elements of a section 12(2) cause of action is
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994). In focusing on the language of the statute, the Court
characterized its responsibility in this area as involving an effort to give force and effect to
the specific language of Congress' definition of the term "security."
21 See supra note 17.
22 See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685-88. Echoing many of the arguments put forward by
the proponents of the sale of business doctrine, Justice Stevens dissented in Landreth. See
id. at 697-700 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
23 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (Supp. 1996). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
enacted in December 1995, added a new subsection to section 12 of the 1933 Act, resulting
in the renumbering of the section 12(1) remedy as section 12(a)(1). Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995); see supra note 4. For the reader's convenience of reference, this
Essay will refer to the rescission remedy now provided in section 12(a)(1) as "section
12(1)."
24 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
25 See id. at 643-47.
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in order. First, though, a word of caution: The following description of the
section 12(2) remedy is based on established precedent interpreting the
language of the 1933 Act in accordance with the analytical framework created
by the Court's pre-Gustafson securities law decisions. However, as several
commentators have pointed out,26 much of this settled understanding has now
been called into question by the Court's reasoning in Gustafson.
Section 12(2) allows the purchaser to obtain rescission from her immediate
seller.27 In other words, the statute allows the buyer to recover her purchase
price from the person (or persons) who constitute the seller (or sellers) of the
securities to that buyer. This relationship is generally referred to as the privity
requirement of section 12.28 In Pinter v. Dab/,29 the Supreme Court gave a
26 For recent commentary discussing the Gustafson decision, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231
(1995); Harold Bloomenthal, Supreme Court Says That Section 12(2) Liability Does Not
Extend to Private Offerings or Secondary Trading, 12 SEc. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 25
(CBC) (April 1995); Fiflis, supra note 1; Maynard, supra note 2; Gerald A. Novack &
Audrey B. Venezia, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: Limiting Section 12(2) Liability to Public
Offerings, 28 REv. SEc. & COMMODITIES REG. 189 (Nov. 8, 1995); Ann D. Wallace &
Mary J. Kosterlitz, Securities Act Liability, in NuTs AND BOLTS OF SEcurRIEs LAW, at 175
(PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 889, 1995); Elliott J. Weiss, Securities
Act Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: Wat Questions Remain?, 50 Bus. LAw.
1209 (1995); Bruce Angiolillo, Gustafson: Section 12(2) Applies Only to 1PO's, N.Y. L.I.,
Mar. 7, 1995, at 1; Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Scope of Section 12(2) After
Gustafson, N.Y. L.., July 6, 1995, at 5; Richard A. Booth, The Scope of Section 12(2)
After Gustafson, 9 INSIGHTs 8 (July 1995); Christine Evans, Court Case May Reduce
Intermediary Liability on Private Placements, CORP. INAN-ING WK., June 19, 1995, at 1;
Roberta S. Karmel, Curtailing avil Liability, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 1995, at 3.
27 In terms of relief, section 12(2) is generally understood to allow the plaintiff to
rescind and get back all of the consideration he paid, if he still owns the
security.... [Alternatively, if] the plaintiff no longer owns the security, he may
recover his "damages." ... The statute makes no attempt to define what these are;
* the damages recoverable under section 12 would, however, presumably be a
"rescissionary" measure of damages since [section 12(2)] basically grants only a right
of rescission.
JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 7, at 1340.
28 See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECUrrmEs REGULATION 281-87,
318-25 (2d ed. 1990); Patricia A. O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REv.
921 (1984); Bryan M. Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Privity




fairly narrow definition to the term "seller" as used in section 12(1).30 Since
Pinter, the lower courts have consistently relied on Pinter to determine the
scope of "seller" for purposes of a section 12(2) cause of action as well.31 In
29 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
30 See id. at 647. The Supreme Court decided the scope of seller in Pinter basing its
analysis in substantial measure on the definitions of "offer" and "sale" found in section 2(3)
of the statute. See id. at 643. In so doing, the Supreme Court rejected the substantial factor
test, which offered a more expansive interpretation of the term "seller" that had been
adopted by several of the lower federal courts. See id. at 648-54.
31 In Pinter v. Dahi, the Court addressed the question of who is a seller for purposes of
section 12(1) only. Id. at 625. However, "lower federal courts have overwhelmingly
applied the [Pinter] holding to cases arising under § 12(2)." MARC STEINBERG, SECURITIES
REGUIATIoN 595 (2d ed. 1993); see Cortec Indus., Inc. v. SUM Holding L.P., 949 F.2d
42, 49 (2d Cir. 1991); Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 1991); Ryder
Int'l Corp. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 1530 (11th Cir. 1991); In re
Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1989); Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v.
IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (2d Cir. 1989); Moore v. Kayport Package
Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1989); Crawford v. Glens, Inc., 876 F.2d 507,
510 (5th Cir. 1989); Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126
(2d Cir. 1989); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 940-42 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that defendant was not seller under section 12(2) under substantial factor test or under Pinter
but not deciding whether or not Pinter applies to section 12(2) claims); Abell v. Potomac
Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1113-15 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492
U.S. 914 (1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988); Pompano-Windy
City Partners Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1265, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand, 787 F. Supp. 787, 799-802 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Scholes v.
Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, 786 F. Supp. 1385, 1399 (N.D. MI1. 1992); In re Sahlen &
Assoc., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 364 (S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Newbridge
Networks Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 275, 280-81 (D.D.C. 1991); Mabon, Nugent & Co. v.
Borey, 127 B.R. 727, 733-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Morin v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051, 1063
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264, 1280 (D.NJ. 1990);
Dalton v. Alston & Bird, 741 F. Supp. 1322, 1331 (S.D. M11. 990); Craig v. First Am.
Capital Resources, 740 F. Supp. 530, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Dawe v. Main Street
Management Co., 738 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D. Mass. 1990); VT Investors v. R & D Funding
Corp., 733 F. Supp. 823, 839 (D.NJ. 1990); Epstein v. Haas Sec. Corp., 731 F. Supp.
1166, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Sellin v. Rx Plus, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1289, 1292 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon Properties, Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1553, 1558
(W.D. Okla. 1989); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 579, 585-86 (N.D. Cal.
1989), rev'd, 950 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Worlds of Wonder See. Litig., 721 F.
Supp. 1140, 1147-48 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 9
(D.D.C. 1989); Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 713 F. Supp. 1019, 1024
(W.D. Mich. 1989), aff'd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir 1991); Jackson v. First Fed. Say. of
Ark., 709 F. Supp. 863, 883 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Scotch v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook
& Weeden, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 95, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities,
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these decisions, the lower courts relied on the Pinter formulation of the term
"seller" primarily on the grounds that they could see no principled way-given
the language of the statute and the tenor of the Supreme Court's decisions
interpreting the federal securities laws-to reach any other result.
To recover under section 12(2), the buyer must also show that the seller
made a misleading statement "by prospectus or oral communication." 32 The
definition of the term "prospectus" had long been interpreted by reference to
the definition of this term found in section 2(10) of the 1933 Act.33 The
statute's definition of prospectus is quite inclusive and a great deal of authority
had developed since the statute's enactment supporting a broad interpretation of
section 12(2)'s use of the term.34 Finally, the buyer must show that the seller's
misleading statement was material.3 5 This element means that the buyer must
show that the statement was one to which a reasonable investor would attach
importance.36
Once these elements are established, the buyer is entitled to relief if the
seller does not sustain a successful defense. Most importantly, though, section
12(2) carries with it what is known as the seller's reasonable care defense,
which requires the defendant to prove "that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of the untruth or
omission.37 The sparse case law describing the scope of this affirmative defense
established that the statute meant what it said: The seller has the burden of
Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1384, 1387-90 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Flournoy v. Peyson, 701 F. Supp.
1370, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Laven v. Flanagan, 695 F. Supp. 800, 813 (D.N.. 1988); In
re Professional Fin. Management Ltd., 692 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1988).
32 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1996).
33 See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 587-88 (7th Cir.
1993); Fiflis, supra note 1.
34 See 1 Louis Loss & JoEL SELIGMAN, SECURIEs REGULATION 460-65 (3d ed.
1989); Therese H. Maynard, The Affinnative Defense of Reasonable Care Under Section
12(2) ofthe Securities Act of 1933, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 57, 77 (1993).
35 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1996).
36 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (expressly adopting 7SC Industries
materiality definition). Although the Supreme Court originally formulated this definition in
the context of implied causes of action under Rule 14a-9 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, lower federal courts have generally followed this standard in
interpreting the concept of materiality under other provisions of the federal securities laws.
See, e.g., Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 919-20 (8th Cir.
1977) (applying the 7SC Industries standard of materiality to a section 12(2) suit); Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 473.
37 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1996).
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demonstrating his, her, or its exercise of reasonable care.38 This burden is
essentially a fact-intensive inquky.39
In sum, Congress left it to the seller to show that he is not culpable, rather
than requiring the buyer to prove state of mind, or scienter, as part of the
plaintiff's case-in-chief.4° Most importantly, as reflected in the facts of
Gustafson,41 section 12(2) allows the seller to demonstrate the parties' agreed-
upon allocation of the due diligence burden and the economic risks of the
transaction.
B. The Facts of Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.
With that brief background, we turn now to the facts of Gustafson.42 The
transaction at issue in Gustafson involved substantially the same kind of
transaction that was at issue in an earlier line of cases developing the sale of
business doctrine.43 Here, all of the stock of an established business, Alloyd
Co., was owned by the seller-defendants. 44 After lengthy negotiations, the
buyer, a sophisticated venture capital firm, entered into a stock purchase
agreement for the acquisition of all of the Alloyd Co. stock from the company's
former shareholders who were acting as sellers. 45 This private resale of stock,
38 See generally 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 34, at 4212-16. "There is not much
law on how this defense may be established." Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 989. The
leading case interpreting the scope of the seller's reasonable care defense is Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981),
although Justice Powell's pointed dissent from the Court's denial of review is quite
instructive in analyzing the standard imposed under section 12(2)'s affirmative defense of
"reasonable" care. See John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005, 1009 (1981).
39 The scope of the seller's obligation under this affirmative defense depends in large
part on who the seller is (control person vs. noncontrol person vs. securities industry
professional) and the relationship of the parties and their bargained-for allocation of risk.
See generally Maynard, supra note 34; Committee on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of Task
Force on Sellers' Due Diligence and Similar Defenses Under the Federal Securities Laws,
48 Bus. LAw. 1185 (1993).
40 Unlike Rule lOb-5 which requires the plaintiff to establish that defendant acted with
scienter, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976), section 12(2) seems to
be predicated on a negligence standard. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 7, at 882.
41 See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
42 The facts and reasoning of Gustafson have been detailed at length elsewhere. See
supra note 26 (listing numerous articles written about Gustafson).
43 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
44 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1064 (1995).
45 See id. at 1065.
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more commonly known as a secondary distribution, was structured to qualify
for an exemption from section 5 registration.46 In addition, the stock purchase
agreement set out a complex formula for the contract price. The parties'
agreement called for a post-closing adjustment of the purchase price based on a
year-end audit to be conducted in the ordinary course of preparing the
business's year-end financials.47 In particular, inventory levels were of concern
to the parties; however, during their negotiations, they decided against an audit
at the time of the closing on the stock purchase in favor of waiting for the usual
year-end audit.48 As a result, the parties agreed to a complex formula for the
adjustment of the purchase price once the results of the year-end audit became
known.49
When completed, the year-end audit showed that the buyer was entitled to
an adjustment of the purchase price.50 The seller stonewalled on paying the
adjustment. 51 The buyer then filed suit in federal court, alleging, among other
claims, a section 12(2) cause of action. 52 While litigation was pending, the
seller-defendant finally decided to pay the requested amount of the price
adjustment pursuant to the parties' agreement. 53 The buyer-plaintiff, however,
refused to accept payment of the post-closing adjustment, deciding instead to
proceed with the rescission remedy of section 12(2). 54 The buyer's claim under
section 12(2) was based primarily on allegations of material misrepresentation
contained in the parties' written contract, i.e., their stock purchase agreement,
including allegations that the seller-defendants made misleading statements
regarding the company's financials, particularly as to the business's inventory
levels. 55
46 For general background regarding the fairly narrow legal issue that was before the
Supreme Court on the facts of the secondary distribution that was at issue in the Gustafson
case, see Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Section 12(2): Private and Seconday
Transactions, N.Y. L., Dec. 15, 1994, at 5; Therese H. Maynard, The Future of
Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. RaV. 817 (1994); Maynard, supra note 1; John
F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, Section 12(2) and Secondary Transactions, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 21, 1994, at 3.











I. THE RESULT IN GUSTAFSON BASED ON METHODOLOGY OF
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
On these facts, neither the buyer nor the seller appears to deserve
sympathetic treatment. Indeed, several commentators have speculated that the
Court may have been reacting to what amounts to bad facts56-simply proving
the truth of that well-worn law school adage "Hard Facts Make Bad Law!"
Although these "bad facts" may very well have influenced the Court, there is
more to this story.
Accepting that this is not a sympathetic case, the crucial question becomes:
In light of the Court's accepted methodology in this area and relying on settled
precedent interpreting the language of the 1933 Act, how should the Supreme
Court have ruled on these "bad facts"? This section describes how the Supreme
Court should have resolved this case based on the Court's own teaching and
established interpretations of the 1933 Act. In other words, if the desired
outcome on these facts was to deny the buyer in Gustafson any recovery under
section 12(2), the analysis that follows will demonstrate how that result could
have been reached without distorting statutory language and without betraying
the method of analysis that had formed the foundation of the High Court's
securities law jurisprudence for at least the last two decades.
As the Supreme Court has been instructing securities lawyers for the last
twenty years, the starting point of the analysis should be the language of
section 12(2) itself. The statute requires the buyer-plaintiff to show that the
seller-defendant made a materially misleading statement-"by prospectus or
oral communication."57 The next step would be to turn to the statute's broad
definition of the term "prospectus," as found in section 2(10).58 Indeed,
established judicial and administrative precedent had interpreted this definition
to include virtually any writing that offers a security for sale.5 9 Based on this
56 See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 26; Edmund W. Kitch, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: An
Opinion That Did Not Write, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 99 (1996).
57 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
58 Under the definition contained in section 2(10) of the 1933 Act, a "prospectus" is
"any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by
radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(10) (1994).
5 9 See generally 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 34, at 463-64 (m particular, the
cases cited in note 173 construing the definition very broadly); id. at 466-77 (describing
administrative authority that reflects the breadth of the SEC's long-standing interpretation of
the statute's definition of "prospectus"). Recently, the breadth of this well-settled
interpretation of section 2(10) has come under increased scrutiny, prompting the SEC to
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settled understanding of the 1933 Act, the stock purchase agreement at issue in
Gustafson would fall within the statute's definition of "prospectus," as that
term is used in section 12(2).60 As to the next element, the buyer in Gustafson
presumably would readily satisfy the statute's built-in privity requirement by
showing that the buyer bought the Alloyd Co. stock from these seller-
defendants. Lastly, the buyer would have to demonstrate that the sellers'
misleading statements regarding inventory contained in the "prospectus"-that
is, the stock purchase agreement-were materal.61
Assuming the materiality element was met, the burden of proof would then
shift to the seller-defendants to demonstrate under section 12(2)'s affirmative
defense that they exercised reasonable care in connection with any statements
made regarding the business's inventory levels. The seller-defendants would be
required to show the candor and truthfulness of statements made to this
financially sophisticated buyer as to what appears to be a heavily negotiated
aspect of the parties' agreement. On these facts, the seller-defendants very
likely would prevail on the reasonable care defense by showing that the parties'
negotiations resulted in an agreed-upon allocation of economic risk as to the
issue a concept release in June 1995 suggesting that it will consider administrative efforts to
scale back its interpretation of this term in light of recent developments in the securities
markets. See Securities Act Release No. 7188 (June 27, 1995), reprinted in FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 85,639 (1993); Linda Quinn, Director of Division of Corporation Finance,
SEC, Reforming the Securities Act of 1933: A Conceptual Framework, Address to the
Committee of Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association Section of
Business Law (Nov. 11, 1995), in 10 INSIGHTS 25 (Jan. 1996).
60 Indeed, that was how the Seventh Circuit disposed of the Gustafson case. See Pacific
Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993). This same line of
reasoning was emphasized by the dissenting opinions in Gustafson. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at
1074, 1079 (Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
61 Under section 12(2), plaintiff's burden of proof is to establish both the existence and
the materiality of the sellers' misleading statements. See supra notes 27-36 and
accompanying text (describing elements of section 12(2) cause of action). This proof,
however, may be undermined by the sellers' efforts to establish their exercise of reasonable
care. For example, on the facts of Gustafson, the seller may be able to successfully claim
that the parties bargained for an allocation of the economic risk associated with the
estimation of the business's inventory levels as set forth in the parties' stock purchase
agreement. This bargained-for arrangement was then reflected in their complex provisions
for adjusting the purchase price depending on the results of the year-end audit. In that case,
the sellers' ability to maintain the affirmative defense of reasonable care undercuts both the
existence and the materiality of plaintiffs allegations of misleading statements made by the
sellers about the business's inventory. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying discussion
(describing how the sellers' affirmative defense may reflect parties' bargained-for allocation
of economic risks of their transaction).
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business's inventory levels. 62
In sum, based on established precedent, the buyer-plaintiff probably could
plead facts as to the elements of a section 12(2) cause of action sufficient to
withstand a demurrer. However, equally probable is that the seller-defendants
could demonstrate their exercise of reasonable care, thereby ultimately denying
the buyer any relief under this express remedy. 63 Therefore, based on its own
teachings, the Supreme Court should have ruled in Gustafson that the buyer
adequately pled a section 12(2) cause of action, but then the Court should have
remanded the case to the lower court with very stern instructions regarding the
availability of the seller's reasonable care defense.64 Had the Court ruled this
way, the Gustafson decision would not be controversial. Instead it would be
rather a non-event, other than the incremental value it would have contributed
to the common law evolution of the federal securities laws.
IV. THE COURT'S METHODOLOGY IN GumSAFSON
In a close decision,65 the Supreme Court in Gustafson rejected, over strong
62 The seller's ability to prevail on tins affirmative defense depends, of course, on the
absence of any misleading statements that deceive the buyer and thereby undercut the
assumptions that form the basis for the formula for the purchase price adjustment included
in the parties' stock purchase agreement.
63 Of course, the seller would still have to absorb the transaction costs associated with
this litigation. Although these costs are always a threat and no set of legal rules can ever
completely immunize against any possibility of a lawsuit, good lawyering can mmize
these costs. As tis Essay demonstrates, however, the methodology of Gustafson
undermines the possibility for good lawyering in the future because lawyers cannot
responsibly counsel their clients on the application of the rule of law amidst the uncertainty
created by the Court's unexplained shift in methodology in Gustafson.
64 Both sides contributed to the hard facts of the Gustafson dispute: The sellers were at
fault for not promptly paying up the post-closmg adjustment-forcing the matter into
litigation. The buyer was at fault for refusing to accept the seller's payment of the post-
closing adjustment-n contravention of the parties' bargained-for allocation of risk. Instead,
the buyer decided to sue to set aside the transaction and recover the entire purchase price.
This turn of events is all the more disturbing when it appears, from the limited factual
record developed at the pleading stage m Gustafson, that the parties negotiated for a
particular outcome if inventory levels actually turned out different from the parties'
assumptions, by calling for a modification of the purchase price to reflect the actual
inventory levels as determined by the year-end audit. See Kitch, supra note 56, at 102.
65 See joan Biskupie, Court Limits Stock Fraud Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1995, at
C2.
inhere are signs m this opinion that Kennedy and his side may have won the majority
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dissenting opinions, what could have been a straightforward application of the
statute's language. Instead, the Court held that this buyer-plaintiff had no cause
of action whatsoever under section 12(2).66 In light of the hard facts of this
case, the Court's decision to deny this buyer any possibility of recovery is not
surprising. What is astonishing is the reasoning used by the Court to conclude
that there is no section 12(2) cause of action whatsoever available to this buyer-
plaintiff. The Court's reasoning in Gustafson betrays its own jurisprudence by
contradicting its methodology for interpreting the federal securities laws. 67
In an abrupt departure from its own teachings, the Supreme Court did not
start with a consideration of the definition of "prospectus" found in section
2(10). Instead, in a most astonishing move, the Court leaped over to section 10
of the 1933 Act, 68 which describes the contents of the disclosure document to
be given to buyers in situations involving registered public offerings. 69 Before
Gustafson, students of federal securities law-that is, scholars, judges,
practicing lawyers, and the SEC-thought that section 10 was implicated only
in situations where the seller decided to register the proposed sale of
securities. 70
By focusing its analysis on section 10, the Court's method of analysis came
as a complete surprise to students of the federal securities laws. 71 In ignoring
only at the last minute. The language of Kennedy's opinion refers so extensively to
dissenting opinions by Thomas and Ginsburg that it suggests that Kennedy originally
was writing a dissent, referring to what was supposed to be the majority.
Id.
66 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1067 (1995).
67 Indeed, Justice Thomas objected to the majority opinion on these grounds. See id. at
1074 (Thomas, ., dissenting). This Essay was written to emphasize that the decision in
Gustafson reflects a shift in the Court's methodology. Although the Court does not explain
the reasons for this shift, nonetheless the Court's betrayal of its established framework for
analyzing issues under the federal securities laws carries important implications for the legal
profession, as will be described in this section of the Essay. The purpose of this Essay,
therefore, is not to discuss what theory of statutory interpretation the Court should use to
decide cases such as Gustafton, nor does the Essay intend either to attack or defend the
plain meaning approach that has generally characterized the Court's opinions in this area.
As to possible theories of statutory interpretation, see infra note 92 and the authorities
collected therein.
68 Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 17j (1994).
70 See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 86-96; Karmel, supra note 26.
71 See, e.g., Bloomenthal, supra note 26; Fiflis, supra note 1. "Even Professor Weiss,
the leading academic proponent of the result reached by the majority, has remarked that
Justice Kennedy's reliance on section 10 is 'mystifying indeed.'" Bainbridge, supra note 26
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section 2(10) and turning instead to section 10, the Court overlooked a well-
established body of precedent that treated writings such as the one at issue in
Gustafson as a "prospectus" within the meaning of section 2(10)'s definition. 72
Likewise, the Court overlooked a well-established body of precedent that relied
on the section 2(10) definition of "prospectus" for purposes of defining this
term as it is used in section 12(2).73 In sum, by failing to start its analysis with
the section 2(10) definition of "prospectus," the Court turned its back on its
own methodology.
Moreover, the Court's reasoning and distortions of statutory language in
Gustafson substantially undermine settled understandings of various other
aspects of the 1933 Act. 74 The Court's shift in methodology creates enormous
uncertainty by upsetting settled interpretations of various provisions of the
federal securities laws. Indeed, the Gustafson opinion is virtually an invitation
to securities lawyers to mount challenges to established interpretations of other
provisions of the 1933 Act.75
(citing Letter from Elliott Weiss to Stephen M. Bainbridge (Apr. 4, 1995) (on file with The
Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law)).72 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
73 Indeed, this flaw in the Court's reasoning was pointed out by the two dissenting
opinions in Gustafson. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074, 1079 (Thomas & Ginsburg, J.1.,
dissenting). The purpose of this brief description of the Court's reasoning in Gustafson is not
to set forth at length criticisms of the Court's analysis of the scope of section 12(2). For
detailed commentary discussing the Court's reasoning, see authorities collected supra note
26. Instead, this brief summary of Gustafson's reasoning is offered to emphasize the shift in
methodology used by the Court in Gustafson in order to set the stage for examining the
implications of the Court's analytical approach in Gusstaon.
74 This abrupt departure from accepted understanding of sections 10 and 2(10) has not
gone unnoticed nor has its potential to undermine other established doctrines under the
federal securities laws. See, e.g., Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078-79 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Fiflis, supra note 1.
75 The Court's reasoning is having a disquieting effect as securities lawyers struggle to
figure out the implications of the Court's strained interpretation of the statute's language.
See, e.g., Robert B. Robbins, Due Diligence in Private Placement Offerings, 28 REv. SEC.
& COMMODTmES RnG. 109 (June 14, 1995) ("If Gustafson is to be taken at its word (and
there are many who believe that it cannot be), section 12(2) cannot be a source of liability to
private parties for misstatements in offers or sales other than in a registered public
offering."); Richard Foster, Due Diligence: An Accident Waiting to Happen?, 15 INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 23 (Mar. 1996). The Court's flawed reasoning and distortions of statutory language
has provided the cannon fodder encouraging lawyers to mount a frontal assault on
established understandings of various other aspects of the 1933 Act as well. Some of these
implications have been identified by the commentators. See, e.g., Bloomenthal, supra note
26; Harold Bloomenthal, Supreme Court Says Sec. 12(2) Liability Does Not Extend to
Private Offerings or Secondary Trading, 17 SEc. & FED. CoRp. L. RP. 38 (CBC) (May
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One example of such a challenge relates to issuers' exempt financings
known as private placements. As part of its private placement, the issuer
generally prepares a disclosure document known as a placement memorandum
(PPM) that is then made available to prospective buyers in these capital
formation transactions. The PPM generally is exempt from registration under
the 1933 Act.76 Although the PPM has traditionally and consistently been
thought of as a "prospectus," 77 several lower courts now feel constrained to
conclude that the PPM, distributed as part of an issuer's exempt private
placement, is not a "prospectus" as that term is interpreted in Gustafson.78
This emerging line of cases is but one example of the disquieting effect that the
Court's reasoning is having on the practice of securities law: It is encouraging
lawyers to challenge established precedent (in this example, the well-established
precedent treating the PPM as a "prospectus" for purposes of the section 12(2)
remedy).
1995); Fflis, supra note 1. Certain well-established precedents under the federal securities
laws have already been challenged in the courts. See, e.g., Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Komanoffv. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); In re Regal Communications Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 94-179, 1995 WL 550454 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 14, 1995); In re U.S.A. Classic See. Litig., No. 93 Civ-6667 (ISM), 1995 WL
363841 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995); In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., No. C-94-1542-SC,
1995 WL 274343 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1995); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90-
Civ.-5788 (DLC), 1995 WL 261518 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995); Endo v. Albertine, No. 88-
C-1815, 1995 WL 170030 (N.D. 11. Apr. 7, 1995).
7 6 Private placement financings using a PPM are frequently conducted pursuant to the
exemption found in section 4(2). 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). In addition, a disclosure
document known as a PPM may also be distributed in connection with issuers' financings
made pursuant to the hybrid exemption of Regulation D. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504 to .506
(1996). For further discussion of the impact of Gustafson on Regulation D financings, see
Bloomenthal, supra note 75.
7 7 Indeed, shortly before the Court's decision in Gustafson, Professor Coffee, a well-
known authority on the federal securities laws, observed that "it is clear beyond argument
that Section 12(2) applies to private placements." John C. Coffee, A Statutory & Caselaw
Primer on Due Diligence Under the Federal Securities Laws, in CONDUCING Dun
DILIGENCE 1995, at 11 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 886, 1995);
see also Karmel, supra note 26, at 33 ("It is axiomatic that although privately placed
securities are exempt from the registration provisions of the Securities Act, they are not
exempt from the antifraud provisions.").
7 8 See Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1995);
ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp 1061, 1064-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Ratner's Group PLC, No. 93 Civ. 7581 (RO),
1995 WL 406167, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1995). For a detailed analysis of these
decisions, see Maynard, supra note 2.
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A. The Impact of the Court's Methodology on the Securities Lawyer
Even more disturbing, however, is that the Supreme Court's methodology
in Gustafson-by casting doubt on established interpretations of the federal
securities laws-carries profound implications for the legal profession as well.
Under generally accepted rules of professional conduct and rules of procedure,
lawyers are required to have some reasonable basis-in law and in fact-to
maintain legal claims.79 The lawyer therefore must be able to show that the
position taken is justified on the law and on the facts. 80 The Court's
methodology in Gustafson expands the boundaries for making that kind of
judgment. In other words, the reasoning in Gustafson now affords lawyers a
basis for taking a position that might possibly persuade a court of the desired
result. By relying on Gustafson's flawed reasoning to expand the boundaries,
lawyers have been relieved in substantial measure of their professional
obligation to exercise judgment. Thus, Gustafson can be seen as relieving
lawyers of the burden of applying established precedent in order to serve as
responsible problem solvers.
Up to now, securities lawyers have been trained to begin their analysis
with the language of the statutes, as augmented by a rich body of administrative
and judicial interpretive authority. As a result, securities lawyers have shared,
at some level, a common understanding of how to think about the federal
securities laws in order to apply the mandates of federal law to a particular
securities law matter. Although there may be reasonable disagreements as to
how the law applies to a particular set of facts, there has been a shared
understanding of the method of analysis to be used to resolve legitimate
differences in interpretations of the relevant portions of the federal securities
laws. In resolving the dispute at issue in Gustafson, the Court distorted the
language of the statute, thereby disrupting established precedent that had
previously formed the framework for the legal analysis of securities law issues.
In so doing, the Court gave permission to securities lawyers to engage in the
same kind of distortion. Thus, the Court's method of analysis in Gustafson
79 See, e.g., MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr Rule 3.1 (1993); FED. R. Civ.
P. 11. The Court's shift in methodology in Gustafson may present implications for the
application of Rule 11 sanctions. For a more detailed discussion of the scope of Rule 11, see
generally GEORGENE M. VAmto, RuLE 11 SANCTIONs: CASE LAW PESPEcrIVES AND
PREVnvE MEAURES (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995); William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11:
Entering a New Era, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 7 (1994); Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule
11: Past as Prologue?, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 39 (1994).
80 See, e.g., Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Frivolous Lawsuits-The Lawyer's Duty to Say
"No," 52 U. CoLo. L. Ray. 367 (1981).
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contributes to the further erosion of the rule of law.
B. Why Did the Supreme Court Use the Reasoning It Did in Gustafson?
In light of the disquieting impact of Gustafson, the question naturally
arises: Why did the Court in Gustafson deliberately choose to turn its back on
its own accepted methodology for analyzing securities law issues? Several
explanations have been offered.
One possible explanation is to regard Gustafson as just another case where
the Supreme Court did not understand the nature of the issue presented by the
case and further did not understand how to apply the relevant securities law
provisions to the problem before it. This explanation, however, rings hollow
when one considers that the dissent in Gustafson understood the relevant
precedent and, indeed, followed the established understanding of the use and
scope of the section 2 definitions within the overall structure of the 1933 Act.8'
Alternatively, Gustafson may be seen as the Court's own effort at securities
litigation reform. The Court's result is at least consistent with this perspective.
In a further effort to limit the availability of federal remedies for securities
fraud, the Court in Gustafson may have decided to adopt a narrow
interpretation of the express remedy of section 12(2).82 However, this is clearly
81 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1074, 1079 (Thomas & Ginsburg, J.J.,
dissenting).
82 See James H. Cheek III, Emerging Issues and Significant Developments in Secwrities
Law, in NuTs AND BOLTS OF SECURITIES LAw, at 573 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. 889, 1995) ("The [Gustafson] decision is a further signal of the
inclination of the Supreme Court to constrain the growth of litigation in the securities
area."); Phillip D. Parker, Overview of Securities Litigation Rformn, in BROKER-DEALER
REGULATION, at 141 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Series No. C977, 1995). Ironically
enough, the Court's decision in Gustafson came at a time when Congress was actively
pursuing its own proposals for reform of securities litigation under the federal securities
laws that culminated in enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See spra
note 4; John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Deregulation: Sense and Nonsense, N.Y. L., Sept. 28,
1995, at 5; Diana B. Henriques, Efforts to Harness SEC Wony Agency Critics Too, N.Y.
TDM, Oct. 23, 1995, at 1.
Another way of looking at Gustafson is to view it an as effort by the Supreme Court to
effect a re-allocation of cases between state and federal courts. This bias has been reflected
in earlier Court decisions, such as Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
with "tlhe practical effect of the decision.., to focus attention on state law as a possible
regulator ..... HAMiTON, CORPORATIONS 943 (5th ed. 1994). It is important to note,
however, that the Court decided Santa Fe Industries using a method of analysis that is now
quite familiar, emphasizing the plain language of the statute and eschewing public policy
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a results-oriented explanation, since this result is obtained at the expense of
doctrinal consistency and is reached only by betraying the Court's own
teachings. This explanation would suggest that the Court is willing to pursue
reform at any cost!
A related argument is that the Court may have been persuaded to take a
restrictive perspective because of a fear that the section 12(2) remedy would
balloon out of proportion, as Rule lOb-5 did in its early years. 83 However, to
the extent the Court's reasoning is predicated on this fear, it is entirely
misplaced. Relief under section 12(2) is based on satisfying the statutory
prerequisites to this express cause of action, and the built-in privity requirement
of section 12(2) substantially limits the availability of this express cause of
action. Moreover, the seller can avoid liability on the merits by meeting the
statute's affirmative defense of reasonable care.84 These statutory prerequisites
imposed by Congress establish important limitations on the availability of this
remedy, unlike the implied cause of action available under Rule lOb-5 where
the federal courts have been left the primary responsibility for defining the
elements of this implied remedy.85
considerations as the basis for the result reached in that case. The Court's reasoning in
Santa Fe Industries therefore stands in marked contrast to the unexplained shift in
methodology that is reflected in the Court's decision in Gustafson.
In a manner consistent with the result reached in Santa Fe Industries, the tenor of the
Gustafson opinion therefore may be seen as reflecting a strong sense that these "private"
transactions-resales of closely held businesses-do not belong in federal court. The
difficulty with this line of reasoning, however, is that it overlooks the clear jurisdictional
premises of the 1933 Act as interpreted by well-settled precedent. Congress imposed the
statute's regulatory framework on "sales" of "securities" using the facilities of "interstate
commerce." Indeed, it was this very understanding of the plain meaning of the statute's
language that led the Supreme Court in Landreth to reject the sale of business doctrine. See
supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text.
8 4 Section 12(2)'s reasonable care defense does not eliminate altogether any possibility
of a lawsuit. However, any effort at securities litigation reform must grapple with the basic
question of whether "reform" is to deny the defrauded securities buyer a cause of action
altogether, or alternatively whether "reform" measures are to concentrate on the litigation
process itself, as by raising pleading requirements, curbing discovery abuses, modifying the
procedures for class action suits, etc. The Gustafson decision (to the extent that it can be
viewed as a crude effort at litigation reform) opts to eliminate a possible cause of action by
narrowing the availability of the express remedy of section 12(2).
85 The Court's discomfort in assuming this responsibility has been well documented
elsewhere. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. However, the Court is not
confronted with that kind of responsibility when applying the terms of the express remedy of
section 12(2). It would have been interesting to allow section 12(2) the chance to develop in
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Another explanation for the Court's reasoning in Gustafson is also related
to the development of the Rule lOb-5 implied remedy. The Supreme Court
could have taken the view that the private remedy of section 12(2) has been
rendered obsolete in light of the intervening judicial development of the implied
remedy of Rule lOb-5. In other words, the Court could have decided Gustafson
the way it did because it views section 12(2) as presenting the potential to upset
the delicate balance the Court has struggled to achieve in its Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence. For the past twenty years or so, the Supreme Court has
struggled mightily to impose limitations on the implied cause of action available
under Rule lOb-5. 86 The Court may very well have worried that these
limitations would be threatened if section 12(2) relief was made broadly
available. 87 Seen from this perspective, Gustafson may be viewed as the
Court's effort to reconcile the remedies of Rule 10b-5 and section 12(2) so as
to protect the integrity of the Court's own jurisprudence interpreting the
implied Rule lOb-5 remedy. 88
There are, however, several difficulties with this explanation for the
Court's methodology in Gustafson. First, this explanation overlooks the fact
that the Court is disregarding the plain meaning of the statute's express remedy
in favor of protecting an implied remedy put in place under the later-adopted
1934 Act. If the Court is willing to distort the clear language of the 1933 Act in
order to preserve its Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, what are the limitations on the
order to determine the efficacy of these legislatively imposed limitations.
86 See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
8 7 Professor Steven Thel has made a variant of this argument. In his Essay, Section
12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183
(1995) (which was published while the Gustafson appeal was pending before the Supreme
Court), Professor Thel asserted that the Court
should follow its own judgment of whether it is wise to limit the remedies available in
securities fraud litigation, even if that judgment conflicts with the statute.... The point
of this Essay is that the language, structure and history of the Securities Act ought not to
determine this debate-the Court is not bound by the statute .... mhe Court is likely
to consider the [Rule] 10b-5 issue, although it may not acknowledge doing so. Despite
the problem of apparent overreaching, if the Court believes that denying some classes
of buyers the remedy of section 12(2) will improve the law, then the Court should
consider doing so even though section 12(2) indicates that it is available to all buyers.
Id. at 1184, 1187, 1192 (footnote omitted).
8 8 Therefore, the Supreme Court does not want to open the door (even a crack) to the
possibility of undercutting its hard-won efforts to contain the scope of relief available under




scope of this authority? Moreover, the Court apparently is now willing to limit
the availability of the section 12(2) express remedy-in contravention of the
plain meaning of the statute's language-in order to give predominance to the
implied remedy of Rule lOb-5. The High Court, however, never gave any
indication as to why the implied remedy of the later adopted statute should
serve as a basis for limiting the express remedy provided by the plain meaning
of the statute's language, especially when this result is reached only by using a
method of analysis that contradicts the Court's own teachings in the area.
Lastly, this effort to protect the hard-won gains in the Court's Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence can be viewed as a substantial overreaction, since the section
12(2) remedy carries specific statutory prerequisites that already limit the scope
of relief available-most notably, the privity requirement and the seller's
reasonable care defense. Thus, any fear by the Court that its Rule lOb-5
jurisprudence will be displaced is not realistic since the procedural limitations
of section 12(2) should operate to prevent this remedy from ballooning the way
Rule lOb-5 did in its infancy.89
Another explanation for the Court's reasoning focuses on the wisdom of
the result reached in Gustafson. Several commentators argued at length for the
result reached in this case.90 However, the argument in support of this result
was predicated in large part on the legislative history of the 1933 Act. These
commentators essentially argued that the section 12(2) cause of action was
9 Or, at least we ought to give section 12(2) a chance to develop-to see if the
statute's prerequisites operate effectively to limit the scope of relief available. This
opportunity would be a chance that section 12(2) really did not have-at least not until quite
recently-in light of the expansive interpretation given early on to the Rule 10b-5 implied
remedy. See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text. Moreover, allowing section 12(2) a
chance to grow and evolve could yield valuable lessons that would be important both from a
legislative perspective in crafting, as well as the judiciary's perspective in interpreting,
securities fraud remedies in the future. Indeed, Gustafson reflects a most ironic twist in the
Court's reasoning. Starting back in the 1970s, the High Court pointed to, and emphasized,
these very same procedural limitations on the express remedies set out in the 1933 and 1934
Acts--including the procedural limitations on section 12(2)-to support imposing a scienter
requirement as well as other restrictions on the implied remedy of Rule lOb-5. See, e.g.,
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976) (Without a scienter requirement,
the Rule 10b-5 implied remedy "would allow causes of action covered by §11, §12(2) [of
the 1933 Act] and §15 [of the 1933 Act] to be brought instead under §10(b) [and its Rule
lOb-5 under the 1934 Act] and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn
procedural restrictions on these express actions.").
90 This view was most forcefully presented by Professor Elliott I. Weiss in his article,
The Cowts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2) Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48
Bus. LAw. 1 (1992).
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limited to a narrow band of activity known as distribution transactions
(generally referred to as public offerings) and that Congress did not intend to
extend the section 12(2) remedy to post-distribution activity (generally referred
to as trading transactions in the secondary markets). 91 Thus, this view is
premised in substantial measure on the legislative history of two great pieces of
legislation (the 1933 and 1934 Acts), which generally indicates that the 1933
Act was concerned primarily with distribution transactions and regulating the
process of capital formation, whereas Congress intended that the 1934 Act
address primarily secondary market trading.92
However, in reaching its result in Gustafson, the Supreme Court declined
to rely primarily on legislative history in favor of an approach that the Court
maintains is based on the statute's language. 93 In other words, the Supreme
Court could have limited the scope of section 12(2)-and denied the buyer-
plaintiff in Gustafson any relief-by relying primarily on its interpretation of
legislative history, but the Court's thrust was elsewhere. Instead, the Supreme
Court preferred to bastardize the statute's language to reach the result it
apparently so desperately wanted, all the while claiming that it was relying on
91 See, e.g., id. at 13-14.
92 This argument is a fairly powerful one that is difficult to meet. However, this
argument draws its force from its reliance on legislative history, thereby revisiting the
ongoing controversy over statutory interpretation, including the role of legislative history in
the courts' interpretation of statutes. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textuaism, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990); Wiflliam N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEo. L.J. 319 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Phillip P. Frickey,
From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77
MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992); Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It Is an
Inkblot We Are Expounding: Section 10(b) As a Rorschach Test, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 41
(1995); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEo. L.J 705 (1992); Jerry L. Mishaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,
and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991); Margaret
V. Sachs, Are Local Governments Liable Under Rule 10b-5? Textualism and Its Limits, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1992); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1992); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.. 353 (1989);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990); Heidi A. Sorensen,
Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation
Discrinnation, 81 GEo. L.J. 2105 (1993).
93 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1066-69, 1071 (1995).
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the plain meaning of the statute's language. So, Gustafson teaches the bench
and bar that if the language of the statute does not seem to get to where one
wants to go, the Supreme Court is willing to distort the statute's language to
get the desired result-rather than rely on legislative history.
V. CONCLUSION
None of the possible explanations for the Supreme Court's shift in
methodology in Gustafson justify the Court's distorted use of the statute's
language in its decision. Moreover, all of these possible explanations share a
fundamental weakness by casually overlooking the most distressing implication
of Gustafson's methodology: None of the explanations take into account the
disquieting effect that the Court's opinion has had on the practice of securities
law and on the ability of securities lawyers to render professional advice in a
responsible fashion to their clients. By distorting the statute's language to reach
the desired result, the Court's opinion shakes the very foundation of some of
the most well-established doctrines in the area of federal securities law.
This uncertain environment-created by the Court's flawed analysis in
Gustafson-is most unfortunate because the capital markets depend on the
predictability and certainty of the legal rules. Parties can rely on their lawyers
to contract around the settled understanding of the default rules established
under the federal securities laws, but the lawyers' efforts depend on a clear
understanding of those relevant rules. Thus, the rule of law is crucial in this
area of practice so that securities lawyers can properly advise their clients on
how to structure their transactions in order to allocate the economic risks of
doing business by appropriate allocation of due diligence burdens. The ability
of securities lawyers to be competent and responsible problem solvers depends
in large part on being able to rely on the Court's heretofore established
framework for analyzing issues and resolving differences in applying the
various provisions of the federal securities laws. This framework has been
substantially undermined by the Supreme Court's methodology in Gustafson.
In short, the Supreme Court in Gustafson ignored another time-honored
adage: If it ain't broke, don't fix it. Instead, the Court decided to fix the scope
of section 12(2)'s express remedy without explaining the need to do so-and
did so by distorting the language of the statute, thereby undermining
established securities law precedent. Left in the wake of Gustafson are very
troubling implications for the ability of securities lawyers to act as responsible
problem solvers.
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